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It’s my job to ﬁ  gure out what a physician’s price 
is. For some it’s dinner at the ﬁ  nest restaurants, 
for others it’s enough convincing data to let 
them prescribe conﬁ  dently and for others it’s my 
attention and friendship...but at the most basic 
level, everything is for sale and everything is an 
exchange. 
—Shahram Ahari
You are absolutely buying love. 
—James Reidy [1]
I
n 2000, pharmaceutical companies 
spent more than 15.7 billion 
dollars on promoting prescription 
drugs in the United States [2]. More 
than 4.8 billion dollars was spent on 
detailing, the one-on-one promotion 
of drugs to doctors by pharmaceutical 
sales representatives, commonly 
called drug reps. The average sales 
force expenditure for pharmaceutical 
companies is $875 million annually [3]. 
Unlike the door-to-door vendors 
of cosmetics and vacuum cleaners, 
drug reps do not sell their product 
directly to buyers. Consumers pay for 
prescription drugs, but physicians 
control access. Drug reps increase drug 
sales by inﬂ  uencing physicians, and 
they do so with ﬁ  nely titrated doses of 
friendship. This article, which grew 
out of conversations between a former 
drug rep (SA) and a physician who 
researches pharmaceutical marketing 
(AFB), reveals the strategies used 
by reps to manipulate physician 
prescribing. 
Better Than You Know Yourself
During training, I was told, when you’re out to 
dinner with a doctor, “The physician is eating 
with a friend. You are eating with a client.” 
—Shahram Ahari
Reps may be genuinely friendly, but 
they are not genuine friends. Drug reps 
are selected for their presentability 
and outgoing natures, and are 
trained to be observant, personable, 
and helpful. They are also trained 
to assess physicians’ personalities, 
practice styles, and preferences, and 
to relay this information back to the 
company. Personal information may 
be more important than prescribing 
preferences. Reps ask for and 
remember details about a physician’s 
family life, professional interests, and 
recreational pursuits. A photo on a 
desk presents an opportunity to inquire 
about family members and memorize 
whatever tidbits are offered (including 
names, birthdays, and interests); these 
are usually typed into a database after 
the encounter. Reps scour a doctor’s 
ofﬁ  ce for objects—a tennis racquet, 
Russian novels, seventies rock music, 
fashion magazines, travel mementos, 
or cultural or religious symbols—that 
can be used to establish a personal 
connection with the doctor. 
Good details are dynamic; the best 
reps tailor their messages constantly 
according to their client’s reaction. 
A friendly physician makes the rep’s 
job easy, because the rep can use 
the “friendship” to request favors, in 
the form of prescriptions. Physicians 
who view the relationship as a 
straightforward goods-for-prescriptions 
exchange are dealt with in a 
businesslike manner. Skeptical doctors 
who favor evidence over charm are 
approached respectfully, supplied with 
reprints from the medical literature, 
and wooed as teachers. Physicians 
who refuse to see reps are detailed by 
proxy; their staff is dined and ﬂ  attered 
in hopes that they will act as emissaries 
for a rep’s messages. (See Table 1 for 
speciﬁ  c tactics used to manipulate 
physicians.) 
Gifts create both expectation 
and obligation. “The importance of 
developing loyalty through gifting 
cannot be overstated,” writes Michael 
Oldani, an anthropologist and former 
drug rep [26]. Pharmaceutical gifting, 
however, involves carefully calibrated 
generosity. Many prescribers receive 
pens, notepads, and coffee mugs, all 
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Table 1. Tactics for Manipulating Physicians
Physician Category Technique How It Sells Drugs  Comments
Friendly and outgoing  I frame everything as a gesture of friendship. 
I give them free samples not because it’s 
my job, but because I like them so much. I 
provide ofﬁ  ce lunches because visiting them 
is such a pleasant relief from all the other 
docs. My drugs rarely get mentioned by me 
during our dinners.
Just being friends with most of my docs 
seemed to have some natural basic effect 
on their prescribing habits. When the time 
is ripe, I lean on my “friendship” to leverage 
more patients to my drugs...say, because it’ll 
help me meet quota or it will impress my 
manager, or it’s crucial for my career.
Outgoing, friendly physicians are every rep’s 
favorite because cultivating friendship is a mutual 
aim. While this may be genuine behavior on the 
doctor’s side, it is usually calculated on the part of 
the rep. 
Aloof and skeptical I visit the ofﬁ  ce with journal articles that 
speciﬁ  cally counter the doctor’s perceptions 
of the shortcoming of my drug. Armed with 
the articles and having hopefully scheduled 
a 20 minute appointment (so the doc can’t 
escape), I play dumb and have the doc 
explain to me the signiﬁ  cance of my article. 
The only thing that remains is for me to 
be just aggressive enough to ask the doc 
to try my drug in situations that wouldn’t 
have been considered before, based on the 
physician’s own explanation.
Humility is a common approach to physicians who 
pride themselves on practicing evidence-based 
medicine. These docs are tough to persuade but 
not impossible. Typically, attempts at geniality are 
only marginally effective.
Mercenary The best mercenary docs are typically 
found further down the prescribing power 
scale. There are plenty of 6’s, 7’s, and 
8’s [lower prescribing doctors] who are 
eagerly mercenary but simply don’t have 
the attention they desire fawned on them. 
I pick a handful out and make them feel 
special enough with an eye towards the 
projected demand on my limited resources 
in mind. Basically, the common motif to 
docs whom you want to “buy out” is to 
closely associate your resource expenditure 
with an expectation—e.g., “So, doc, you’ll 
choose Drug X for the next 5 patients who 
are depressed and with low energy? Oh, and 
don’t forget dinner at Nobu next month. I’d 
love to meet your wife.” 
This is the closest drug-repping comes to 
a commercial exchange. Delivering such 
closely associated messages crudely would 
be deemed insulting for most docs so a rep 
really has to feel comfortable about their 
mercenary nature and have a natural tone 
when making such suggestions.
Drug reps usually feel more camaraderie with 
competing reps than they do with their clients. 
Thus, when a doctor fails to fulﬁ  ll their end of the 
prescriptions-for-dinners bargain, news gets around 
and other reps are less likely to invest resources in 
them. 
High-prescribers I rely on making a strong personal 
connection to those docs, something to 
make me stand out from the crowd. 
Friendship sells. The highest prescribers (9’s 
and 10’s) are every reps sugar mommies and 
daddies. It’s the equivalent of spitting in the 
ocean to try to buy these docs out because, 
chances are, every other rep is falling head 
over heels to do so.
 The highest prescribers receive better presents. 
Some reps said their 10’s might receive unrestricted 
“educational” grants so loosely restricted that they 
were the equivalent of a cash gift, although I did 
not personally provide any grants.
Prefers a competing 
drug
The ﬁ  rst thing I want to understand is why 
they’re using another drug as opposed to 
mine. If it’s a question of attention, then 
I commit myself to lavishing them with it 
until they’re bought. If they are convinced 
that the competitor drug works better in 
some patient populations, I frame my drug 
to either capture another market niche 
or, if I feel my drug would fare well in a 
comparison, I hammer its superiority over 
the competing drug. 
If, during the course of conversations, the 
doctors say something that may contradict 
their limited usage of our products, then 
the reps will badger them to justify that 
contradiction. This quickly transforms the 
rep from a welcomed reprieve to a nuisance, 
which can be useful in limited circumstances. 
We force the doctors to constantly explain 
their prescribing rationale, which is tiresome. 
Our intent is to engage in discourse but 
also to wear down the doc until he or she 
simply agrees to try the product for speciﬁ  c 
instances (we almost always argue for a 
speciﬁ  c patient proﬁ  le for our drugs).
For reps this is a core function of our job. We’re 
trained to do this in as benign a way as possible. No 
doc likes to be told their judgment is wrong so the 
latter method typically requires some discretion.
Acquiescent docs Most docs think that if they simply agree 
with what the rep says, they’ll outsmart the 
rep by avoiding any conﬂ  ict or commitment, 
getting the samples and gifts they want, and 
ﬁ  nishing the encounter quickly. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. The old 
adage is true, especially in pharmaceutical 
sales: there is no such thing as a free lunch. 
From the outset of my training, I’ve been 
taught to frame every conversation to 
ultimately derive commitments from 
my clients. With every acquiescent nod 
to statements of my drug’s superiority I 
build the case for them to increase their 
usage of my product. They may offer me 
false promises but I’ll know when they’re 
lying: the prescribing data is sufﬁ  ciently 
detailed in my computer to conﬁ  rm their 
behavior. Doctors who fail to honor their 
commitments, no matter how casually 
made, convert the rep into a badgering 
nuisance. The docs are often corralled into 
a conversational corner where they have to 
justify their previous acquiescence. 
Gifts are used to enhance guilt and social pressure. 
Reps know that gifts create a subconscious 
obligation to reciprocate. New reps who doubt 
this phenomenon need only see their doctors’ 
prescribing data trending upwards to be convinced. 
Of course, most of these doctors think themselves 
immune to such inﬂ  uence. This is an illusion reps try 
to maintain.
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items kept close at hand, ensuring that 
a targeted drug’s name stays uppermost 
in a physician’s subconscious mind. 
High prescribers receive higher-end 
presents, for example, silk ties or golf 
bags. As Oldani states, “The essence of 
pharmaceutical gifting…is ‘bribes that 
aren’t considered bribes’” [1].
Reps also recruit and audition 
“thought leaders” (physicians respected 
by their peers) to groom for the 
speaking circuit. Physicians invited and 
paid by a rep to speak to their peers 
may express their gratitude in increased 
prescriptions (see Table 1). Anything 
that improves the relationship between 
the rep and the client usually leads to 
improved market share.
Script Tracking
An ofﬁ  cial job description for a pharmaceutical 
sales rep would read: Provide health-care 
professionals with product information, answer 
their questions on the use of products, and 
deliver product samples. An unofﬁ  cial, and more 
accurate, description would have been: Change the 
prescribing habits of physicians. 
—James Reidy [4]
Pharmaceutical companies monitor the 
return on investment of detailing—and 
all promotional efforts—by prescription 
tracking. Information distribution 
companies, also called health 
information organizations (including 
IMS Health, Dendrite, Verispan, and 
Wolters Kluwer), purchase prescription 
records from pharmacies. The majority 
of pharmacies sell these records; 
IMS Health, the largest information 
distribution company, procures records 
on about 70% of prescriptions ﬁ  lled 
in community pharmacies. Patient 
names are not included, and physicians 
may be identiﬁ  ed only by state 
license number, Drug Enforcement 
Administration number, or a pharmacy-
speciﬁ  c identiﬁ  er [5]. Data that identify 
physicians only by numbers are linked 
to physician names through licensing 
agreements with the American Medical 
Association (AMA), which maintains 
the Physician Masterﬁ  le, a database 
containing demographic information 
on all US. physicians (living or dead, 
member or non-member, licensed 
or non-licensed). In 2005, database 
product sales, including an unknown 
amount from licensing Masterﬁ  le 
information, provided more than $44 
million to the AMA [5]. 
Pharmaceutical companies are the 
primary customers for prescribing data, 
which are used both to identify “high-
prescribers” and to track the effects of 
promotion. Physicians are ranked on 
a scale from one to ten based on how 
many prescriptions they write. Reps 
lavish high-prescribers with attention, 
gifts, and unrestricted “educational” 
grants (Table 1). Cardiologists and 
other specialists write relatively few 
prescriptions, but are targeted because 
specialist prescriptions are perpetuated 
for years by primary care physicians, 
thus affecting market share. 
Reps use prescribing data to see 
how many of a physician’s patients 
receive speciﬁ  c drugs, how many 
prescriptions the physician writes for 
targeted and competing drugs, and 
how a physician’s prescribing habits 
change over time. One training guide 
states that an “individual market share 
report for each physician…pinpoints 
a prescriber’s current habits” and is 
“used to identify which products are 
currently in favor with the physician 
Table 1. Continued
Physician Category Technique How It Sells Drugs  Comments
No-see/ No-time 
(hard-to-see docs)
Occasionally docs refuse to see reps. Some 
do it for ethical reasons, but most simply lack 
the time. Even when I don’t manage to see 
the doctor, I can still make a successful call 
by detailing the staff. Although they’re on 
the doc’s side for the most part, it’s amazing 
how much trouble one can rile up when the 
staff are lavished with food and gifts during 
a credible sounding presentation and then 
asked to discuss the usage of a drug on their 
patients. 
It’s a victory for me just to learn from the 
staff about which drugs are preferred, 
and why. That info provides powerful 
ammunition to debate the docs with on 
the rare occasions that I might see them. 
However, it’s a greater success when the 
staff discusses my meds with the doc after I 
leave. Because while a message delivered by 
a rep gets discounted, a detail delivered by 
a co-worker slips undetected and unﬁ  ltered 
under the guise of a conversation. And the 
response is usually better then what I might 
accomplish. 
One’s marketing success in a particular ofﬁ  ce can 
be strongly correlated to one’s success in providing 
good food for the staff. Goodwill from the staff 
provides me with critical information, access, and 
an advocate for me and my drug when I’m not 
there. 
Thought leaders As a rep, I was always in pursuit of friendly 
“thought leaders” to groom for the speaking 
circuit. Once selected, a physician would 
give lectures around the district. I would 
carefully watch for tell-tale signs of their 
allegiance. This includes how they handled 
questions that criticized our product, how 
their prescribing habits ﬂ  uctuated, or simply 
how eager they were to give their next 
lecture.
The main target of these gatherings is 
the speaker, whose appreciation may be 
reﬂ  ected in increased prescribing of a 
company’s products. Local speaking gigs 
are also auditions. Speakers with charisma, 
credentials, and an aura of integrity 
were elevated to the national circuit 
and, occasionally, given satellite telecast 
programs that offered CMEs. 
Subtle and tactful spokespersons were the ideal 
candidates. I politely dismissed doctors who would 
play cheerleader for any drug…at the right price, 
of course.
These descriptions are based on SA’s experience working for Eli Lilly and testimony in IMS Heath Inc. v. Ayotte, US District Court, New Hampshire. Actual tactics may vary. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040150.t001
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040150.g002
(Photo: “Pills” by Rodrigo Senna, at http://
www.ﬂ  ickr.com/photos/negativz/74267002/. 
Published under the Creative Commons 
Attribution License.)
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in order to develop a strategy to 
change those prescriptions into Merck 
prescriptions” [6]. 
A Pharmaceutical Executive article 
states, “A physician’s prescribing 
value is a function of the opportunity 
to prescribe, plus his or her attitude 
toward prescribing, along with outside 
inﬂ  uences. By building these multiple 
dimensions into physicians’ proﬁ  les, it is 
possible to understand the ‘why’ behind 
the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of their behavior.” 
[7] To this end, some companies 
combine data sources. For example, 
Medical Marketing Service “enhances 
the AMA Masterﬁ  le with non-AMA 
data from a variety of sources to not 
only include demographic selections, 
but also behavioral and psychographic 
selections that help you to better target 
your perfect prospects” [8]. 
The goal of this demographic slicing 
and dicing is to identify physicians 
who are most susceptible to marketing 
efforts. One industry article suggests 
categorizing physicians as “hidden 
gems”: “Initially considered ‘low value’ 
because they are low prescribers, 
these physicians can change their 
prescribing habits after targeted, 
effective marketing.” “Growers” are 
“Physicians who are early adopters of 
a brand. Pharmaceutical companies 
employ retention strategies to continue 
to reinforce their growth behavior.” 
Physicians are considered “low value” 
“due to low category share and 
prescribing level” [9].
In an interview with Pharmaceutical 
Representative, Fred Marshall, president 
of Quantum Learning, explained, “…
One type might be called ‘the spreader’ 
who uses a little bit of everybody’s 
product. The second type might be 
a ‘loyalist’, who’s very loyal to one 
particular product and uses it for most 
patient types. Another physician might 
be a ‘niche’ physician, who reserves our 
product only for a very narrowly deﬁ  ned 
patient type. And the idea in physician 
segmentation would be to have a 
different messaging strategy for each of 
those physician segments ” [10].
In Pharmaceutical Executive, Ron 
Brand of IMS Consulting writes 
“…integrated segmentation analyzes 
individual prescribing behaviors, 
demographics, and psychographics 
(attitudes, beliefs, and values) to ﬁ  ne-
tune sales targets. For a particular 
product, for example, one segment 
might consist of price-sensitive 
physicians, another might include 
doctors loyal to a given manufacturers 
brand, and a third may include those 
unfriendly towards reps” [11]. 
In recent years, physicians have 
become aware of—and dismayed 
by—script tracking. In July 2006, 
the AMA launched the Prescribing 
Data Restriction Program (see 
http:⁄⁄www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/12054.html), which allows 
physicians the opportunity to withhold 
most prescribing information from 
reps and their supervisors (anyone 
above that level, however, has full 
access to all data). According to an 
article in Pharmaceutical Executive, 
“Reps and direct managers can view 
the physician’s prescribing volume 
quantiled at the therapeutic class 
level” and can still view aggregated or 
segmented data including “categories 
into which the prescriber falls, such 
as an early-adopter of drugs, for 
example….” [12]. The pharmaceutical 
industry supports the Prescribing Data 
Restriction Program, which is seen 
as a less onerous alternative to, for 
example, state legislation passed in 
New Hampshire forbidding the sale 
of prescription data to commercial 
entities [13].
The Value of Samples 
The purpose of supplying drug 
samples is to gain entry into doctors’ 
ofﬁ  ces, and to habituate physicians to 
prescribing targeted drugs. Physicians 
appreciate samples, which can be 
used to start therapy immediately, test 
tolerance to a new drug, or reduce 
the total cost of a prescription. Even 
physicians who refuse to see drug 
reps usually want samples (these 
docs are denigrated as “sample-
grabbers”). Patients like samples too; 
it’s nice to get a little present from 
the doctor. Samples also double as 
unacknowledged gifts to physicians 
and their staff. The convenience of an 
in-house pharmacy increases loyalty 
to both the reps and the drugs they 
represent.
Some physicians use samples to 
provide drugs to indigent patients 
[14,15]. Using samples for an entire 
course of treatment is anathema to 
pharmaceutical companies because this 
“cannibalizes” sales. Among the aims of 
one industry sample-tracking program 
are to “reallocate samples to high-
opportunity prescribers most receptive 
to sampling as a promotional vehicle” 
and “identify prescribers who were 
oversampled and take corrective action 
immediately” [16]. 
Studies consistently show that 
samples inﬂ  uence prescribing choices 
[14,15,17]. Reps provide samples only 
of the most promoted, usually most 
expensive, drugs, and patients given a 
sample for part of a course of treatment 
almost always receive a prescription for 
the same drug. 
Funding Friendship
While it’s the doctors’ job to treat patients and not 
to justify their actions, it’s my job to constantly 
sway the doctors. It’s a job I’m paid and trained 
to do. Doctors are neither trained nor paid to 
negotiate. Most of the time they don’t even realize 
that’s what they’re doing…
—Shahram Ahari
Drug costs now account for 10.7% 
of health-care expenditures in the 
US [18]. In 2004, spending for 
prescription drugs was $188.5 billion, 
almost ﬁ  ve times as much as what was 
spent in 1990 [19]. Between 1995 and 
2005, the number of drug reps in the 
US increased from 38,000 to 100,000 
[20], about one for every six physicians. 
The actual ratio is close to one drug 
rep per 2.5 targeted doctors [21], 
because not all physicians practice, 
and not all practicing physicians are 
detailed. Low-prescribers are ignored 
by drug reps. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040150.g003
(Photo: “Pills” by Sugar Pond, at http://www.
ﬂ  ickr.com/photos/sugarpond/236235191/. 
Published under the Creative Commons 
Attribution License.)
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Physicians view drug information 
provided by reps as a convenient, 
if not entirely reliable, educational 
service. An industry survey found that 
more than half of “high-prescribing” 
doctors cited drug reps as their main 
source of information about new 
drugs [22]. In another study, three 
quarters of 2,608 practicing physicians 
found information provided by reps 
“very useful” (15%) or “somewhat 
useful” (59%) [23]. However, only 
9% agreed that the information was 
“very accurate”; 72% thought the 
information was “somewhat accurate”; 
and 14% said that it was “not very” or 
“not at all” accurate. 
Whether or not physicians believe in 
the accuracy of information provided, 
detailing is extremely effective at 
changing prescribing behavior, 
which is why it is worth its substantial 
expense. The average annual income 
for a drug rep is $81,700, which 
includes $62,400 in base salary plus 
$19,300 in bonuses. The average cost 
of recruiting, hiring, and training a 
new rep is estimated to be $89,000 
[24]. When expenses are added to 
income and training, pharmaceutical 
companies spend $150,000 annually 
per primary care sales representative 
and $330,000 per specialty sales 
representative [25]. An industry article 
states, “The pharmaceutical industry 
averages $31.9 million in annual sales 
spending per primary-care drug…Sales 
spending for specialty drugs that treat a 
narrowed population segment average 
$25.3 million per product across the 
industry.” [25] 
Conclusion
As one of us (SA) explained in 
testimony in the litigation over 
New Hampshire’s new ban on the 
commercial sale of prescription 
data, the concept that reps provide 
necessary services to physicians and 
patients is a ﬁ  ction. Pharmaceutical 
companies spend billions of dollars 
annually to ensure that physicians most 
susceptible to marketing prescribe 
the most expensive, most promoted 
drugs to the most people possible. 
The foundation of this inﬂ  uence is a 
sales force of 100,000 drug reps that 
provides rationed doses of samples, 
gifts, services, and ﬂ  attery to a subset 
of physicians. If detailing were an 
educational service, it would be 
provided to all physicians, not just 
those who affect market share. 
Physicians are susceptible to 
corporate inﬂ  uence because they 
are overworked, overwhelmed with 
information and paperwork, and 
feel underappreciated. Cheerful and 
charming, bearing food and gifts, drug 
reps provide respite and sympathy; 
they appreciate how hard doctor’s 
lives are, and seem only to want to 
ease their burdens. But, as SA’s New 
Hampshire testimony reﬂ  ects, every 
word, every courtesy, every gift, and 
every piece of information provided is 
carefully crafted, not to assist doctors 
or patients, but to increase market 
share for targeted drugs (see Table 1). 
In the interests of patients, physicians 
must reject the false friendship 
provided by reps. Physicians must 
rely on information on drugs from 
unconﬂ  icted sources, and seek friends 
among those who are not paid to be 
friends.  
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